The Place of the User in Copyright Law by Cohen, Julie E.
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2005 
The Place of the User in Copyright Law 
Julie E. Cohen 
Georgetown University Law Center, jec@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/61 
 
74 Fordham L. Rev. 347-374 (2005) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 













The Place of the User in Copyright Law 
 
 
                                                            
 
74 Fordham L. Rev. 347-374 (2005) 
                                                               
 
 
                                         Julie E. Cohen 
                                                     Professor of Law 




This paper can be downloaded without charge from: 
Scholarly Commons:  http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/61/ 
SSRN:  http://ssrn.com/abstract=814664 
 
Posted with permission of the author 
PANEL I: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
PUBLIC VALUES
THE PLACE OF THE USER IN COPYRIGHT LAW
Julie E. Cohen*
I. THREE CHARACTERS IN SEARCH OF THE USER
The past decade has witnessed an upsurge of interest, on the part of both
copyright owners and copyright scholars, in users of copyrighted works.
Copyright owners have sought to gain greater control of user behavior,
particularly with regard to unauthorized copying of digital files, and to
instantiate new norms about the limits of appropriate use. Copyright
scholars, meanwhile, have debated the empirical and normative bases for
these efforts, as well as the language employed to frame the discussion. In
particular, much criticism has been leveled at the term "consumer," which
some scholars have charged has misleading and normatively inappropriate
connotations about the ways that humans receive and interact with cultural
goods) Most of us now seem to have settled, though not without some
awkwardness, on "users," a term that manages simultaneously to connote
both more active involvement in the processes of culture and a residual aura
of addiction that may be entirely appropriate to the age of the iPod, the
XBox, and the blogosphere.
Copyright doctrine, however, is characterized by the absence of the user.
As copyright moves into the digital age, this absence has begun to matter
profoundly. As I will show, the absence of the user has consequences that
reach far beyond debates about the legality of private copying, or about the
proper scope of user-oriented exemptions such as the fair use and first sale
doctrines. The user's absence produces a domino effect that ripples through
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Thanks to Joel Reidenberg for
inviting me to participate in the symposium on Law and the Information Society, to Niva
Elkin-Koren, Joseph Liu, Michael Madison, David McGowan, Marc Spindelman, Rebecca
Tushnet, Molly Van Houweling, and Fred von Lohmann for helpful comments and
conversations, and to Matthew Windsor and Robert Dowers for research assistance.
© 2005, Julie E. Cohen. This work is made available under a Creative Commons license for
noncommercial use with attribution, supplemented to require acknowledgement of initial
publication in the Fordham Law Review. For the terms of the license, see
http://creativecomons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5/.
1. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper
Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 Fed. Comm.
L.J. 561 (2000).
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the structure of copyright law, shaping both its unquestioned rules and its
thorniest dilemmas. The resulting imbalance-empty space where one
cornerstone of a well-balanced copyright edifice should be-makes for bad
theory, bad policy, and bad law.
In what follows, I do not intend to argue that copyright is, as some have
asserted, "a law of users' rights." 2 I am happy to agree that copyright is
first and foremost a law of authors' rights, and that having some such law
is, in general, a good idea. That statement, however, doesn't end the
discussion; it begins it. A theory of authors' rights must be informed by a
theory of the user as well. Specifically, it is commonly understood that
users play two important roles within the copyright system: Users receive
copyrighted works, and (some) users become authors. Both roles further
the copyright system's larger project to promote the progress of knowledge.
But copyright law and policy have shown little interest in understanding the
processes by which these roles are performed, nor in inquiring what users
need to perform their roles in a way that optimizes the performance of the
copyright system as a whole.
The models of the user offered by copyright scholars have not helped as
much as they could in answering these questions. In broad brush, scholarly
efforts to cast the user have produced three fully fledged candidates, each
more unrealistic than the last: the economic user, who enters the market
with a given set of tastes in search of the best deal; 3 the "postmodern" user,
who exercises limited and vaguely oppositional agency in a world in which
all meaning is uncertain and all knowledge relative;4 and the romantic user,
whose life is an endless cycle of sophisticated debates about current events,
discerning quests for the most freedom-enhancing media technologies, and
home production of high-quality music, movies, and open-source software. 5
2. See L. Ray Patterson & Stanley W. Lindberg, The Nature of Copyright: A Law of
Users' Rights (1991); see also Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors and Users in Copyright, 45 J.
Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. 1 (1997).
3. See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
Jukebox (2d ed. 2003); Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated
Rights Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 557 (1998); see
also William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev.
1203 (1998). Each of these users is to some extent an oversimplification. As a general rule,
however, oversimplification is what survives when the arguments of law review articles are
distilled in a form suitable for the larger public debate about copyright policy, so I think this
move is defensible.
4. See, e.g., James Boyle, Shamans, Software, and Spleens: Law and the Construction
of the Information Society (1996); Rosemary J. Coombe, The Cultural Life of Intellectual
Properties: Authorship, Appropriation, and the Law (1998). As Coombe rightly notes,
"postmodem" properly understood has both a broader and more specific definition than this
formulation suggests. Rosemary J. Coombe, Fear, Hope, and Longing for the Future of
Authorship and a Revitalized Public Domain in Global Regimes of Intellectual Property, 52
DePaul L. Rev. 1171, 1172 & n. 1 (2003). Whether rightly or not, however, "postmodern" is
the adjective that copyright scholars most commonly associate with this user, see, e.g.,
Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 7-8, so it is the term that best suits my purposes here.
5. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the
Law to Lock Down Culture and Control Creativity (2004); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air
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As we will see, although some of these characters are better adapted to
certain situations than to others, none of them provides a convincing model
of how real users actually behave, and none furnishes a compelling account
of how this behavior relates to copyright's collective goals. As a result (and
unsurprisingly, since neither judges nor legislators are as unreflective as we
sometimes like to believe), none has filled the gap in the law that results
from the user's absence.
A few scholars, however, have offered tantalizing glimpses of a fourth
candidate for the role of user. Building on those beginnings, this essay
introduces a new character, the situated user. Unlike the economic and
romantic users, who seek respectively to consume and to transform existing
works, the situated user deserves copyright law's solicitude precisely
because neither her tastes nor her talents are so well formed. Both her
patterns of consumption and the extent and direction of her own authorship
will be shaped and continually reshaped by the artifacts, conventions, and
institutions that make up her cultural environment. Unlike the postmodern
user, this imperfect being requires our attention because she must
nevertheless become the vehicle by and through which copyright's
collective project is advanced. The situated user engages cultural goods and
artifacts found within the context of her culture through a variety of
activities, ranging from consumption to creative play. The cumulative
effect of these activities, and the unexpected cultural juxtapositions and
interconnections that they both exploit and produce, yield what the
copyright system names, and prizes, as "progress." This model of the
situated user suggests that the success of a system of copyright depends on
both the extent to which its rules permit individuals to engage in creative
play and the extent to which they enable contextual play, or degrees of
freedom, within the system of culture more generally.
II. "PRIVATE COPYING"
The debate about private copying is an instructive place to begin our
search for the user in copyright law, since that debate is ostensibly user
focused. The user is absent, both literally and conceptually, from every part
of the private copying debate. That debate concerns user behavior as an
aggregate phenomenon to be molded and disciplined; it does not reckon
with users themselves, their reasons for copying, or the functions that
private copying serves within the copyright system, in any meaningful way.
Within the U.S. copyright system, the public-private distinction that
historically shielded many individual uses of copyrighted works from
liability is fast disappearing. In some cases, legal exposure results from
technical changes in the means of use. For works distributed in digital
form, use requires reproduction in computer memory. In other cases,
to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354 (1999); Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-to-Amateur, 46
Win. & Mary L. Rev. 951 (2004).
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copying that excited little enforcement interest in the era of analog
reproduction excites intense interest now that the copies are digital. In the
digital era, according to the Register of Copyrights, private uses shade
"seamlessly" into acts of public distribution; from this formulation, it
follows equally seamlessly that infringement liability is necessary to
preserve the rights that copyright guarantees. 6  In both cases, liability
results from the same two basic principles: The rule defining infringement
as any reproduction of a copy not excused by a fact-specific defense and the
rule establishing strict liability for infringement. 7 Notably, these principles
operate without reference to users or to categories of use; they are triggered,
instead, by the mere technical processes of copying or rendering digitally
stored information.
In countries that have codified exemptions for private copying, the legal
status of the user is slightly more complicated but no less marginal. This
can be seen by examining a handful of recent cases in which European
consumer advocacy groups asserted a legal right to engage in private
copying of music CDs and argued that technological protection measures
("TPMs") interfered with that right. A Belgian court concluded that
Belgian law did not afford a right to copy, but only "a granted immunity
against prosecution"; by definition, therefore, plaintiffs could not assert any
interest that had been violated.8 This answer requires no theory of the user
and leaves no room for one; any shelter for private copying in national law
encompasses only whatever remains technologically copiable. The other
two cases, in France, reached conflicting results. The Paris Appeals Court
ruled that the use of TPMs to prevent copying was "incompatible with the
private copy exception,"9 while the Versailles Appeals Court concluded that
use of TPMs was a justifiable means of preventing piracy (although
actionable under French consumer protection law regulating labeling of
consumer goods). 10 Both of these answers leave room for a theory of the
user, but the contours of that theory are open to doubt pending resolution by
France's high court. Legal commentators in Europe, meanwhile, cannot
agree whether private copying exemptions are intended to effectuate a
general theory of the user or simply a pragmatic compromise between the
entertainment and technology industries that is open to ongoing
6. Marybeth Peters, Copyright Enters the Public Domain, 51 J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A.
701, 708 (2004); see also Goldstein, supra note 3, at 23-24, 144-46, 199-208 (arguing that,
absent prohibitive transaction costs, copyright should extend broadly to cover most private
uses of copyrighted works).
7. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1), 501(a) (2000); see also id. § 101 (defining "copies").
8. Tribunal de Premibre Instance de Bruxelles, May 25, 2004, No. 2004/46/A du r6le
des refer6 s (Belg.).
9. Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Apr. 22, 2005, No. RG:03/8500;
see Lawrence J. Speer, Security Features on DVDs Violate Private Copying Right, Says
French Court, BNA Elec. Comm. & L. Rep., Apr. 27, 2005, at 441.
10. Cour d'Appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Versailles, Apr. 15, 2005, No.
03/07172; see Lawrence J. Speer, EM! France May Use Digital Locks on CDs, but Court
Orders Refunds for Griping Users, BNA Elec. Comm. & L. Rep., Apr. 27, 2005, at 442.
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negotiation." They also cannot agree whether article 5 of the European
Union's 2001 copyright directive, which permits exemptions to copyright
rights only in "special cases" that "do not conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work" and "do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the rightholder" forbids private copying exemptions in any
event. 12
At first blush, the U.S. story and most parts of the European story
comport reasonably well with the narrative of the economic user. Within
that narrative, it makes sense that private copying should be infringing, or
should become so as new abilities to exploit markets develop. Clear rights
for information providers keep prices low, and enable information providers
to develop product offerings to satisfy users at different price points. 13 The
economic user's motivations for unauthorized copying are easy to
understand-he is trying to get away with paying less than the market price
for a particular cultural good-but thwarting them is untroubling for the
same reason. It makes equal sense that exemptions should be narrowly
limited, and should give way in the face of technological protection
measures employed by copyright owners. The opposite situation would
hinder effective price discrimination and cause prices to rise. Within the
narrative of the economic user, it would make sense for the French high
court to reverse the Paris decision and affirm the Versailles decision.
On closer inspection, though, the narrative of the economic user is too
superficial to explain, or enable resolution of, the profound societal
ambivalence about the strategies now being employed to shift user
behavior. The entertainment and publishing industries have embarked on a
coordinated set of rhetorical and legal initiatives to reeducate users about
the death of copyright's public-private distinction. An economically
inclined theorist might describe these initiatives as efforts to decrease user
preferences for unauthorized copying, but that explanation seems
incomplete. The industries' efforts are intended not only to change the
cost-benefit calculus that users make about private copying, but also and
more fundamentally to invest unauthorized private copying with moral
significance. Monetizable cost and shame play coequal roles in cementing
the new moral order. Nor can public and scholarly resistance to these
efforts be interpreted simply in terms of resistance to transition costs.
Widespread criticisms of both their substantive and their procedural aspects
bespeak considerable doubt about where the highest social welfare really
lies. While homo economicus may of course have moral preferences as
11. See, e.g., Kamiel J. Koelman, The Levitation of Copyright: An Economic View of
Digital Home Copying, Levies and DRM (July 27, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=682163. As
Koelman discusses, in many countries a system of compensation via levies on recording
equipment and blank media plays a role in this compromise. Id.
12. Parliament & Council Directive 2001/29/EC, art. 5(5), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10; see
Christophe Geiger, Right to Copy v. Three-Step Test: The Future of the Private Copy
Exception in the Digital Environment, 6 Computer L. Rev. Int'l 7 (2005)
13. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 3, at 589-90; Fisher, supra note 3, at 1234-40.
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well as monetary ones (and indeed the two types of preferences are often
intertwined), markets are not the ultimate arbiters of moral choices.
Responsible economic theorists recognize that defining a social utility
function always requires a priori resolution of certain normative questions.
In the case of private copying, the narrative of the economic user can't
answer the normative questions because it presumes a particular utility
function already in place. What is needed, and what the theory of the
economic user cannot itself provide, is a theory about why users and user
privacy should, or should not, matter enough to dictate a particular
approach to copyright policy.
As another indication that the narrative of the economic user is
incomplete, the copyright industries have proved curiously resistant to
testing their claims about the clarity and innate justice of copyright's broad
protections in open court. Instead, the ongoing litigation campaign against
peer-to-peer file sharing funnels complaints against identified users to a
private settlement service center that offers them a choice between a
confidential, relatively small monetary settlement and public financial
ruin. 14 This strategy cleverly blunts the public disapproval that many
argued would ensue if the industry chose to seek the maximum damage
award from each user, and with it any call for broad-based reform of the
copyright rules governing liability and damages. Less obvious but equally
important, it denies courts the opportunity to craft equitable limitations on
damage awards that might coalesce into a more general rule limiting
liability in such cases. Courts have erected due process "speed bumps" to
this process at the complaint filing and subpoena stages, 15 but the judiciary
is structurally unable to address the larger issues raised by cases that
reappear within the system only as voluntary dismissals. The private
copying cases have become the copyright system's dirty little secret, a site
at which questions of due process are overlooked and the more difficult
questions of liability and privacy evaded.
Neither of our remaining two characters can point the law toward a more
satisfactory approach to the question of private copying. For the romantic
user, this is so by choice. The romantic user's interests lie in the realm of
14. See Nick Mamatas, Meet John Doe: The RIAA Runs Its Lawsuits as a Volume
Business, and Sometimes Downloaders Just Gotta Settle, Village Voice, Mar. 7, 2005, at 34,
available at http://www.villagevoice.com/music/0510,mamatas,61813,22.html; Andrew
Tran, Woman Silenced by Music Mafia, Daily Texan, Feb. 4, 2005, available at
http://www.dailytexanonline.com/global-user-elements/printpage.cnfm?storyid=852298.
15. See Recording Indus. Assn. of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229
(D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 309 (2004) (ruling that § 512(h) of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") does not authorize subpoenas to an internet service
provider ("ISP") to identify users of peer-to-peer ("p2p") file-sharing systems, but only to
identify users who store infringing material on the ISP's system); Sony Music Entm't, Inc. v.
Does 1-40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (ruling that subpoenas to an ISP to identify
users in the context of "John Doe" litigation must satisfy a five-part balancing test); BMG
Music v. Does 1-203, No. 04-650, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8457 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 2, 2004)
(ruling that a separate "John Doe" complaint must be filed for each user whose identity is
sought).
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so-called transformative copying (of which more below); he has little to say
about either the costs or the benefits that other sorts of private copying
might generate. The postmodern user's problem is the reverse: She finds
the law's treatment of private copying enormously troubling, but can't offer
any explanation that would convince lawmakers to care. For the
postmodern user, struggle against economic and cultural hegemony is a fact
of life; exactly for this reason, though, she has difficulty articulating what
the problem is with this particular alignment of legal, technical, and
rhetorical power.
Copyright scholars, for the most part, have been complicit in the legal
system's failure to engage the difficult questions that private copying raises.
Most of us readily concede that private copying is and should be
infringement in the first instance, unless excused as fair use. 16 Most of us
seem reasonably sure that it would be unfair to require individual file
sharers (or their parents) to pay hundreds of thousands of dollars in
penalties for their activities, but few have read this queasiness as an
argument for a more general overhaul of the Copyright Act's remedial
provisions. Even the authors of a proposal to facilitate direct disputes
between copyright owners and individual users single out "extraordinary"
users, because they do not know what to do with the ordinary ones. 17 A
user-centered theory of what copying is private (or why no copying is)
would help enormously in resolving this question, but few have tried to
articulate a theory of lawful private copying that could provide a sustainable
answer. Instead, most copyright scholars have preferred to debate the
intricacies of secondary liability for technology developers, whom they see
as more closely linked to copyright's progress project. Yet, as we shall see
next, that discussion also takes its shape from the user's absence.
III. TOOLS FOR USERS
The debate about secondary copyright infringement liability for
technology developers is also, and necessarily, a debate about what tools
will be available to users, under what conditions. Yet the conventional
framing of the tests for liability, and of the underlying choices they require,
elides the user. Legal battles over secondary liability are understood as
zero-sum games between copyright owners and technology developers, in
which the certain risk of widespread lawlessness is pitted against the
uncertain benefits of unconstrained innovation. This framing has produced
a legal climate that rewards technologies that more tightly constrain private
use of copyrighted content and punishes those that do not. Closer attention
to users, and willingness to envision a world in which not all users are
16. A notable exception is Jessica Litman. See Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright
(2001); Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 1 (2004).
17. Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement
Without Restricting Innovation, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1345, 1399-1401, 1413 (2004).
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infringers, might produce a different framing and a correspondingly
different set of ground rules.
Consider, first, the split between the Seventh Circuit and the Ninth
Circuit on the proper application of the "staple article of commerce"
standard articulated in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios to
peer-to-peer ("p2p") file-sharing systems. 18 In In re Aimster Copyright
Litigation, the Seventh Circuit was concerned primarily with the proper
allocation of responsibility to minimize lawlessness. That concern led the
court to place the burden of justifying system design, and of showing
quantitatively substantial lawful uses, on the defendant. 19 In A&MRecords
v. Napster, Inc. and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster Ltd., the
Ninth Circuit took the opposite road, articulating a qualitative substantiality
standard for lawful uses and refusing to explore the more persistent
connections between architecture and conduct. 20 The court viewed this
approach as mandated by Sony's emphasis on the need to avoid granting
right holders control of commercial activity unrelated to infringement. 21
When asked to revisit Sony and resolve the tension between control of
infringement and control of innovation, the Supreme Court tried to avoid
the zero-sum game by choosing both sides. The Grokster Court reaffirmed
Sony, citing the benefits to innovation, but declined to specify the precise
content of the substantiality standard. Instead, it offered the copyright
industries another tool for pursuing wrongdoers that purported to focus on
intent rather than design.22 But the Grokster compromise likely will prove
unstable, both because the copyright industries need not accept the Court's
implicit invitation to pursue an inducement-based litigation strategy to the
exclusion of other strategies, and because the Court was unwilling to
remove design entirely from the liability equation in inducement cases.
Although a careful footnote stresses that design alone is not evidence of
unlawful intent, the body of the Court's opinion makes clear that design
may be considered together with other evidence. 23 To the extent that this
rule permits contributory infringement cases to become inducement cases, it
simply shifts the zero-sum game to a new playing field.
Within all parts of this emerging framework the user is an afterthought.
The Napster court rejected Napster's efforts to assert fair use by p2p users
as a substantial noninfringing use of the Napster system. Focusing on the
18. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) ("[T]he
sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute
contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable
purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses.").
19. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 649-50, 653 (7th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 1107 (2004).
20. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1162-66 (9th
Cir. 2004), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d
1004, 1020-22 (9th Cir. 2001).
21. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020-21; Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1160-62.
22. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2777-80.
23. Id. at2781 &n.12.
[Vol. 74
HeinOnline -- 74 Fordham L. Rev. 354 2005-2006
2005] THE PLACE OF THE USER IN COPYRIGHT LAW 355
market that could emerge if private consumptive copying were forbidden,
the court ruled that use of the Napster system to share copyrighted works
was a commercial use that harmed this nascent market. 24 It relied on the
fair use portion of the Sony opinion principally to support its conclusion
that market harm should be presumed from this commerciality,
notwithstanding the fact that the Court has since disapproved such
presumptions in fair use cases.25 The Napster court read Sony as an opinion
about when aggregate private copying should give way to markets, not an
opinion about when individuals' private copying should remain private, and
there is much in Sony to support such a reading. The Aimster court briefly
speculated about the possibility that p2p systems might enable lawful
"space-shifting" of music files, and expressed itself willing in principle to
extend Sony's fair use holding beyond Sony's facts. 26 Ultimately, however,
because the court read Sony narrowly on the question of contributory
infringement, it didn't much matter. Aimster could not have shown that
space-shifting alone was a quantitatively substantial use of its system, and
even if it had so shown, it could never have shown that its system could not
be modified to allow this use but not others. The Grokster appellate panel
focused on the use of defendants' networks to facilitate authorized sharing
and sharing of public domain works, neither of which requires a theory of
the user to explain its legality.2 7 This framing, in turn, produced the
divergence between quantitative and qualitative substantiality that prompted
the Court to grant review and then to articulate a standard for inducement
that entangles intent with design. The Court's unanimous opinion envisions
users in aggregate, as an installed base of would-be thieves to whose baser
instincts the Grokster defendants deliberately appealed.2 8
The Aimster court also declined the offer of a different point of entry
from which to craft a theory of the user, this time based on the privacy
value of encrypted communications. The court was willing to acknowledge
that privacy is an important feature of an electronic communications system
in the abstract, but unwilling to consider whether the importance of privacy
should cause it to think differently about the private copying problem.
29
Across a broad range of legal topics, the tension between the interest in
privacy and the interest in law enforcement creates extraordinarily difficult
problems, and I do not seek to resolve those problems here. My point here
is simply that the elision of the user from the debates about private copying
and secondary liability weights the scales against the privacy argument as
24. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1015-17.
25. Id. at 1016 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
451 (1984)); see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994).
26. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 652-53 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied,
540 U.S. 1107 (2004).
27. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1161-62 (9th
Cir. 2004), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005); see also Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2787, 2789-90
(Breyer, J., concurring).
28. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2772-73, 2781.
29. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 650-5 1.
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well. If some private copying is lawful, then the perceived conflict between
protecting privacy and preventing infringement is no longer so stark, and
privacy cannot plausibly be described as coextensive with lawlessness.
The p2p controversy has exerted a powerful gravitational pull on the
debate about secondary copyright infringement liability. In part because
litigation strategies on both sides have given p2p technologies heightened
salience for scholars, lawmakers, and the general public, it has become
conventional to think of p2p as the "biggest" and most important part of this
debate, and therefore to conclude that the most important doctrinal problem
concerns the appropriate treatment of general purpose technologies that
operate on a stand-alone or anonymous basis. Neither of these propositions
is true. The words "stand-alone," "anonymous," and "p2p" do not describe
the vast majority of networked digital media technologies now available to
users, many of which incorporate elements of ongoing networked control
for technical and business reasons that have little or nothing to do with
copyright law. As to these technologies, the Ninth and Seventh Circuits are
in general agreement that if ongoing networked control allows knowledge
of specific acts of infringement and enables the technology developer to
prevent them, and the developer fails or refuses to do so, liability will arise
under one or both of the two leading theories. 30 This rule about specific
knowledge creates enormous potential liability that the Sony rule, which
concerns constructive knowledge, cannot neutralize. The rule that ongoing
control creates ongoing obligations to police does not consider whether
users might have legitimate interests of their own to assert against such
policing.
If we consider instead the market for digital video recorders as it existed
at the time of the ReplayTV litigation, the inadequacies of the legal debate
about secondary copyright infringement become more apparent. The
ReplayTV device was neither a p2p file-sharing tool nor a stand-alone
product, but rather a networked digital video recorder that included two
unprecedented features. One enabled users to skip commercials
automatically when playing back television programming, and the other
gave users the ability to exchange recorded files via the Internet with other
ReplayTV users. A group of movie and television studios sued the
manufacturer, SonicBlue, for enabling infringement of their copyrights, and
requested that SonicBlue produce a complete listing of the television
programming downloaded by each ReplayTV user. 31 When SonicBlue
refused, the studios moved to compel production, and convinced a
30. See Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1162-66 (indicating that, per Napster, specific knowledge
plus control would establish liability under both theories); Aimster, 334 F.3d at 649, 653
(indicating that specific knowledge alone would not be enough to establish liability for
contributory infringement, but that knowledge plus failure to engage in cost-effective
redesign would be); see also Randal C. Picker, Rewinding Sony: The Evolving Product,
Phoning Home and the Duty of Ongoing Design, 55 Case W. Res. L. Rev. (forthcoming
2005) (arguing that this rule is economically sound).
31. Paramount Pictures Corp., v. ReplayTV, No. CV 01-9358, 2002 WL 1315811 (C.D.
Cal. Apr. 29, 2002).
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magistrate judge to grant their request. This order generated considerable
publicity, and a number of civil liberties and consumer organizations filed
an amicus brief supporting SonicBlue's request that the district court
overturn it. The district court granted SonicBlue's request, but not on any
of the privacy-related grounds urged by these amici; rather, it ruled that
since SonicBlue did not currently collect the requested information, it was
under no duty to rewrite its software to do so.
Shortly after the denial of the studios' motion to compel discovery of
user download information, five ReplayTV users filed a declaratory
judgment action against the studios, seeking to force the court to focus more
carefully on the fair use issues raised by the dispute with SonicBlue. The
studios moved to dismiss this lawsuit, asserting that they had never
demonstrated any intent to sue individual ReplayTV users. The court ruled
that in light of the ongoing litigation against SonicBlue, predicated on direct
infringement by users, a justiciable controversy existed.32 At the individual
plaintiffs' request, the court consolidated their lawsuit with the underlying
infringement lawsuit. Nine months later, however, SonicBlue filed for
bankruptcy and sold its ReplayTV business to a subsidiary of a major
Japanese consumer electronics company, which agreed to remove the
features that had motivated the original lawsuit.33 After that lawsuit had
settled, the studios won dismissal of the user lawsuit by agreeing not to sue
any of the five individual plaintiffs for infringement. 34
Within the legal landscape of secondary copyright infringement liability,
the ReplayTV litigation is the functional equivalent of Conan Doyle's dog
that did not bark in the night; it is worth considering closely as much for
what did not happen as for what did. First, the case was not litigated to a
ruling on the merits, and this is important for two reasons. The outcome-
financial ruin for the defendant and modification for the technology-was
more favorable to the studios than a litigated victory on the merits would
have been, and the studios clearly knew this. Successfully concluded
litigation culminating in citable precedent is both more expensive and less
generalizable to other potential defendants. And to the extent that some
uses of the ReplayTV corresponded much more closely to those ruled fair
in Sony, a complete victory on the merits was by no means certain. From
the studios' perspective, then, the case made a much less desirable vehicle
for framing both public and judicial debates about the secondary liability of
technology providers. The contested discovery request likely served
multiple purposes. It was intended to plug what the Supreme Court had
characterized as an evidentiary hole in Sony,35 but it probably was also
intended to be burdensome whether SonicBlue resisted or complied.
32. Newmark v. Turner Broad. Network, 226 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1220 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
33. See Eric A. Taub, ReplayTV's New Owners Drop Features that Riled Hollywood,
N.Y. Times, July 21, 2003, at C3.
34. See Paramount Pictures Corp. v. ReplayTV, 298 F. Supp. 2d 921, 923-24 (C.D. Cal.
2004).
35. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454-56 (1984).
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Second, although the district court ruled that SonicBlue need not generate
new information about ReplayTV users, it did not rule that the requested
information was irrelevant or privileged. The court's order therefore cannot
be read as establishing a general rule protecting information about private
uses of digital media technologies from discovery. To the contrary, it
seems clear that if the information had existed in some readily extractable
form, the court would have ordered SonicBlue to produce it. This fact is
significant because the legal framework that has emerged from the more
high-profile p2p file-sharing cases makes it more, not less, likely that
technology developers will configure their systems to produce such
information in the future, or will simply design systems that give users less
flexibility to begin with. After Aimster and Grokster, both deliberate
engineering to avoid collecting user information and deliberate engineering
to preclude ongoing control over user activities may be judged culpable. It
is unsurprising that the leader in the digital video recorder market, TiVo,
has begun negotiating with the entertainment industries and modifying its
product to comply with their requests. 36
Finally, notwithstanding their request for user download records, the
studios did not really want to know much about actual users and their
activities, nor did they wish to have a court examine those activities too
closely. The discovery request played a key tactical role in the studios'
own lawsuit, from which actual users were literally absent. In the user-
initiated lawsuit, the industry plaintiffs' primary goal was to avoid a merits
ruling by any means possible. 37 Doctrinally, closer attention to users and
their activities might serve to counteract the debilitating indeterminacy
about the appropriate standard of liability to which technology developers
are now subject. The ReplayTV episode shows that in the high-stakes
world of the high-technology startup venture, the successful litigation
campaign against p2p developers has increased the likelihood that
defendants offering other types of technologies will either fail or fold,
making closer attention to users and their activities increasingly less
likely.38
This dynamic-elision of the user followed by seemingly inexorable drift
toward a highly constrained digital media environment-also characterizes
disputes about the scope of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's
("DMCA") prohibitions on trafficking in circumvention tools. Legally
speaking, DMCA liability is formally distinct from copyright infringement
liability. But as more and more digital content is distributed subject to
36. See Gina Piccalo, TiVo Will No Longer Skip Past Advertisers, L.A. Times, Nov. 17,
2004, at Al.
37. See Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings at 14-17 ,24-37, Newmark v. Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc., 226 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (No. CV 02-4445), available at
https://www.eff.org/IP/Video/Newmark-vTumer/20020812_newmarktranscript.pdf.
38. In all of the ways just discussed, secondary copyright infringement litigation follows
the general dynamic identified by Marc Galanter. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves"
Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 Law & Soc'y Rev. 95
(1974).
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TPMs, from the perspective of both technology developers and users, the
distinction between digital media technologies and technical protection
measures is increasingly artificial. 39 For technology developers at risk of
secondary liability, the same conduct can trigger both sorts of claims. For
users, both sorts of claims (or threats) shape the range of tools available for
experiencing and manipulating digital content.
Like the Supreme Court in Grokster, Congress seems to have believed
that in the DMCA it successfully split the difference between the competing
imperatives of enforcement and innovation. The vehicle for this synthesis,
Congress thought, was the statute's bifurcated structure, which
distinguishes between TPMs that function as access controls and those that
protect against violation of the exclusive rights of copyright owners.40
Because Congress thought that the major copyright industries had shown a
need for additional protection against widespread unauthorized copying, the
DMCA bans the manufacture and distribution of tools for circumventing
both types of TPM.4 1 With respect to individual acts of circumvention,
however, it prohibits only those acts directed at access controls, not acts
directed at rights controls. Congress thought a ban on the circumvention of
access controls appropriate and fair, because otherwise users could
circumvent to avoid payment.4 2  Legislative forbearance as to rights
controls, Congress believed, would ensure that users remained free to
devise means of their own choosing to circumvent rights controls as
necessary to exercise the privileges afforded them under copyright law.4 3
In fact, the statutory distinction between access controls and rights
controls has effectively neutralized not only the intended shelter for users,
but also any shelter for tools designed for well-intentioned, paying users to
employ toward legitimate ends. Consider a TPM that allows the user to
play a music or video file but prevents copying. According to the
legislative rationale for the DMCA's bifurcated structure, this TPM is a
rights control. Yet in litigation over circumvention of the Content
Scrambling System ("CSS") algorithm, which encrypts DVD movies to
allow playback but not copying, courts acquiesced without question in the
entertainment industries' classification of CSS as an access control.44 This
39. Cf Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and Digital Things, 56
Case W. Res. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2006) (arguing that the boundaries of things are legally
constructed).
40. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)-(b) (2000).
41. See H.R. Rep. No. 105-55 1, pt. 1, at 18-19 (1998), reprinted in Melville B. Nimmer
& David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright: Congressional Committee Reports on the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act and Concurrent Amendments 5-1, 5-24 to -26 (2000); S. Rep.
No. 105-190, at 28-30 (1998), reprinted in Nimmer & Nimmer, supra, at 4-1, 4-33 to -35.
42. See H.R. Rep. No. 105-55 1, pt. 1, at 17-18.
43. See id. at 18; S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 28-29.
44. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000),
amended as 111 F. Supp. 2d 346, 347, aff'd sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley,
273 F.3d 429, 440-42 (2d Cir. 2001); Paramount Pictures Corp. v. 321 Studios, No. 03-
CV8970, 2004 WL 402756 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2004); 321 Studios v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1095 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
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construction ensures that only authorized DVD players-as opposed to
authorized users-may access the encrypted content.4 5  But if only
authorized players can make authorized access, then two further
conclusions follow. First, as others have remarked, if every act of rendering
protected content is an act of accessing the content and the statute prohibits
individual circumvention of access controls, then the individual privilege to
circumvent rights controls exists only in theory. 46 The judicially driven
elision of the user thus fundamentally changes the intended effect of the
statute. The implications of this result for the fair use privilege are the
subject of Part IV.
For purposes of this part, the more pertinent result of construing "access"
to refer to devices and not to people is that the development of unauthorized
media players violates the ban on tools for circumventing access controls.
This rule grants the entertainment industries the control over innovation in
technology markets that Sony withheld. 47  It constrains technology
developers who seek to offer rival platforms for digital content, and it
constrains the users who experience its consequences. Since PC-based
media players are also computer programs, in theory the DMCA's
exception for reverse engineering should prohibit this result. That
exception permits circumvention "to achieve interoperability of an
independently created computer program with other programs," and was
intended to preserve competition in the software industry.48 Courts have
found a variety of ways to avoid reaching this conclusion, however, and it
would be hard to square with their conclusion that the statute's tool
prohibitions target precisely this conduct. 49
45. See, e.g., Corley, 273 F.3d at 444 (rejecting the argument that "an individual who
buys a DVD has the 'authority of the copyright owner' to view the DVD" and holding that §
1201(a) "exempts from liability those who would 'decrypt' an encrypted DVD with the
authority of a copyright owner, not those who would 'view' a DVD with the authority of a
copyright owner").
46. See, e.g., Jacqueline Lipton, The Law of Unintended Consequences: The Digital
Millennium Copyright Act and Interoperability, 62 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 487, 494-95
(2005); R. Anthony Reese, Will Merging Access Controls and Rights Controls Undermine
the Structure of Anticircumvention Law?, 18 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 619, 650-51 (2003);
Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-
Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 519, 543 (1999).
47. One decision that rejects this approach is Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink
Technologies, Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1669 (2005).
The court ruled that a provider of universal garage door openers did not violate the DMCA
when it made its product compatible with a garage door system protected by a rolling code
mechanism because the system's manufacturer had necessarily granted users permission to
access the system in order to open their garages. Id. at 1204. The Chamberlain decision,
however, implicitly permits a right holder to develop mass-market licensing policies that
withdraw the privilege of access.
48. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(0 (2000); see Comm. on the Judiciary House of Representatives,
105th Cong., Section-by-Section Analysis of H.R. 2281 as Passed by the United States
House of Representatives on August 4, 1998, Comm. Print 105-6, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. 14,
reprinted in Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 41, at 7-1, 7-19 to -20.
49. See, e.g., Davidson & Assoc. v. Jung, No. 04-3654, 2005 WL 2095970, at *8 (8th
Cir. Sept. 1, 2005) (holding § 1201(0 inapplicable because circumvention of the "secret
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Once again, none of our three users is well placed to help litigators and
courts consider whether and why users and their motivations should play a
more central role in these disputes. As in the case of private copying, the
choice to minimize lawlessness is superficially consistent with the narrative
of the economic user, as is the evolution of an incentive structure that
informally discourages developers from offering tools and platforms that
lack built-in controls. More specifically, the controversy surrounding the
p2p cases has produced a narrative of the economic user that is constructed
at the intersection of economics and geography: "Users" are local; users
who seek to share files via digital networks are no longer users, but rather
"pirates." The equation ofp2p file sharing with piracy in turn reinforces the
prevailing judicial interpretation of the applicable legal rules and deepens
its shadow. But the ReplayTV and DeCSS problems disrupt this new
narrative of the economic user in two ways. At least some ReplayTV users
simply wished to assert greater control over their viewing experiences in the
(local) privacy of their own homes, and at least some of the globally
distributed downloaders of DeCSS really did want only to watch DVDs on
computers running Linux. Once again, the economic user can't answer the
questions about overall utility (of privacy and of technological "openness")
that these problems raise.50
The romantic and postmodern users are, respectively, unable and
unwilling to help frame the problem differently. The romantic user is
handicapped, once again, by the fact that most use of these technologies is
purely consumptive. Although the romantic user benefits enormously from
new technologies for manipulating and publishing digital content (a
problem that Part IV takes up in more detail), the facts of the paradigm case
don't match the romantic user's profile. The postmodern user responds to
the problems of secondary liability and DMCA liability largely by asserting
their irrelevance to her own conduct. The more sophisticated versions of
this argument invoke the famed "darknet hypothesis," which asserts that the
copyright industries cannot prevent the truly determined user from gaining
access to unprotected content and manipulating it with the tools of her
choice. 51 The postmodern user seeks out and celebrates darknets, and her
handshake" procedure for accessing video games' multi-player mode enabled unauthorized
copies of games to be played in multi-player mode, thereby causing infringement);
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 347 (holding § 1201(f) inapplicable because defendants did
not themselves do any reverse engineering, because they disseminated the DeCSS program
too widely, and because DeCSS, an intermediate artifact of the open source process, was a
Windows utility and thus did not serve the "sole" purpose of enabling DVD interoperability
with Linux).
50. It may be that we would conclude that the costs of accommodating these users'
preferences should weigh more heavily than the benefits of doing so. My only point here is
that the economic user is definitionally incapable of performing the necessary inquiry.
51. See Peter Biddle et al., The Darknet and the Future of Content Distribution, in
Proceedings of the 2002 ACM Workshop on Digital Rights Management (2002),
http://crypto.stanford.edu/DRM2002/darknet5.doc; see, e.g., Fred von Lohmann, Measuring
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Against the Darknet: Implications for the Regulation
of Technological Protection Measures, 24 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 635 (2004).
HeinOnline -- 74 Fordham L. Rev. 361 2005-2006
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
romanticization of samizdat renders her both less capable of offering a
coherent thesis about how the law should regulate technology and less
sympathetic when she tries to do so. It is hard to celebrate legal marginality
and assert the law's responsibility at the same time.
For the most part, academic discussions of the contributory liability
problem or of the DMCA's device ban have not focused on either the need
for a theory of the user or the inability of our existing cast of characters to
satisfy that need. Such discussions have largely bought into the framing of
the problem as a game played between entertainment and technology
interests. In light of the profound effect that the user's absence exerts on
both law and practice, this failure to attend to the user is singularly ill-
advised. A theory of the user is essential to defining the appropriate
relationship between design and liability in the networked digital age.
IV. TRANSFORMATIVE USERS
In debates over modem copyright policy, transformative uses lie at the
opposite pole from private consumptive copying; their value is well
understood and widely acknowledged. In fact, transformative uses have
more in common with private copying than is widely appreciated. Just as in
the case of private copying, the user's conduct is central to the problem that
the law seeks to solve, but users themselves are absent from the analysis.
There is broad consensus on the social value of transformative uses, but our
understanding of the users who make them is hazy. And just as in the case
of secondary liability, the user's absence shapes the law in powerful and
largely unexamined ways. The effect is especially pronounced as the
prospects for transformative use become more closely linked to the
availability of tools for manipulating digital content.
In most fair use cases, the identity of the user is known, the use has
already been made, and the only question is whether or not it passes muster.
Perhaps for these reasons, courts and commentators evaluating fair use
cases tend to talk about uses as faits accomplis. Although the fair use
analysis requires nods to abstract and general qualities such as
"commerciality," the question of lawfulness is rarely related in any
systematic way to the process that led to the use.
The consistent exceptions to this rule are the cases discussing whether the
fair use doctrine shields decompilation of computer software for purposes
of reverse engineering the software's unprotected functional requirements.
As a practical matter, reverse engineering generally cannot be done without
decompilation, a fact that forces attention to follow-on creation as a process
in which the user is constrained by what has gone before. In this context,
courts and most commentators have concluded that the copying required to
perform that process is fair.52 Because of their specialized subject matter,
52. Sony Computer Entr't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000);
Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532 (1 1th Cir. 1996); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade,
Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and
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the software reverse engineering decisions tend to be understood as sui
generis. If one reads these decisions together with those examining more
closely the scope of copyright in computer microcode, that conclusion no
longer seems quite so straightforward. Those decisions hold that the
copyright in a program does not protect functional principles embodied in
the program, but the functionality principle that they articulate is only partly
literal. The courts' approach to functionality is also partly, and importantly,
metaphoric. Not all of the copying permitted by courts meets a strict
necessity criterion, which is to say that not all features deemed unprotected
are necessary for the software to function. For many features,
uncopyrightability follows from industry standard practice or customer
expectation. 53 The software copyright decisions thus reflect a view of
copyrightability, and by extension of fair use, that is broadly user-centered.
Programmers may write programs that communicate with each other and
with users on the terms that the market has come to expect.
A fair use doctrine more attentive to the ways in which context shapes
creative practice might conclude, by analogy to the metaphoric functionality
principle that emerges from the software copyright cases, that a broader
range of uses undertaken by users for purposes of interoperating with their
own culture should be permissible. 54 Because the fair use analysis focuses
on uses rather than on users, and on fair use asfait accompli rather than fair
use as process, most courts have steadfastly resisted developing such
principles of "cultural interoperability" to apply in non-software cases.
Accordingly, they have rejected fair use arguments asserted by creators of
such things as trivia guides to popular television shows 55 and a satiric
treatment of the O.J. Simpson trial that also targeted the breathlessly
juvenile quality of its coverage in the mass media. 56  Both of these
Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 Yale L.J. 1575, 1612 (2002) (summarizing legal
commentary on the fair use question).
53. See MiTek Holdings, Inc. v. Arce Eng'g Co., 89 F.3d 1548, 1556-57 (11th Cir.
1996); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 817-18 (1st Cir. 1995), aff'd
without opinion, 516 U.S. 233 (1996); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d
1435, 1444 (9th Cir. 1994); Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 714-15
(2d Cir. 1992); Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1474-75 (9th Cir.
1992). But see Dun & Bradstreet Software Svcs., Inc. v. Grace Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d
197 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that industry standard status must be assessed from the copyright
owner's perspective, not the alleged infringer's perspective).
54. For examples of decisions that move the law closer to such an approach, see Ty, Inc.
v. Publ'ns Int'l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002) (distinguishing complementary and
substitutional uses of copyrighted content), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1110 (2003), and SunTrust
Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (1 1th Cir. 2001) (holding that a novelist's use
of Margaret Mitchell's Gone With the Wind as a vehicle for expressing her own views on
slavery and Reconstruction was permissible). Although framed in very different terms, both
approaches are rooted in a rejection of strict necessity as the criterion for transformative
copying. See also Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 802 (9th Cir.
2003) (observing, in the context of a more traditional parody case, that fair use protects
parody even though "one could make similar statements through other means").
55. Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998);
Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1993).
56. Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
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examples involve users in the process of communicating about their culture
using widely accepted cultural vocabularies. A fair use doctrine more
attentive to the ways in which context shapes creative practice would be
more inclined to approve them. In these cases and others like them, the
elision of the user affects both the range of uses determined to be fair and
the range of uses likely to be made in the future.
Failure to connect fair uses to fair users and to the creative process also
shapes litigation under the DMCA's provisions banning circumvention
tools. As discussed in Part III, the prevailing judicial interpretation of those
provisions renders the limited privilege for individual acts of circumvention
a nullity, and the provisions on their face place circumvention tools beyond
most individuals' reach in any event. In case after case, courts have been
asked to rule that the tool bans are therefore constitutionally infirm.
Litigants have argued that a fair use exception to copyright is
constitutionally required, and that the absence of a meaningful
circumvention privilege frustrates this requirement because it effectively
precludes most users from making fair uses, including transformative uses,
of technologically protected digital content. Courts uniformly have rejected
the latter argument, reasoning that the DMCA simply forecloses certain
methods of use, and that the fair use doctrine does not guarantee access to
any particular method. 57  If fair uses are understood as an abstract,
undifferentiated set of end products, this conclusion seems perfectly
reasonable. Opponents of the DMCA have not shown why this
understanding is inadequate.
The argument crafted by opponents of the DMCA requires meticulous
attention to the causal connections that link diminished ability to
manipulate digital content with diminished prospects for fair use more
generally. Opponents must show: that an important category of uses
requires direct copying; that individuals will not have a meaningful ability
to circumvent TPMs if they cannot get tools from others; that many works
will not be meaningfully available in other formats; and that other methods
of copying technologically protected content will not be meaningfully
sufficient. None of these propositions is straightforward. Establishing
them requires understanding fair use as a process that emerges from
"ordinary" use and is shaped by environmental, motivational, and resource
constraints. Consider first the simplest possible argument that an opponent
of the DMCA might make: By analogy to cases discussing the importance
of literary quotations for purposes of biography and criticism, the ability to
copy sounds and images is essential for effective fair use commentary on
audiovisual works. 58 This argument does not appear to depend on process
57. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 346-47 (S.D.N.Y.
2000), aff'd sub nora. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 459 (2d Cir.
2001); 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1101-02
(N.D. Cal. 2004); United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1125 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
58. See, e.g., Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1260-65 (2d Cir. 1986);
Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966);
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considerations-it presumes both access to the underlying work and a fully
formed intention to comment on it-but if one accepts it, such
considerations are nonetheless important to establish the remaining
propositions. What does the fact that a work is available in analog format
in the Library of Congress mean for a would-be fair user in New Mexico?
Are patterns of copying determined by paths of least resistance, so that if
copying is expensive and inconvenient, or requires additional equipment to
exploit the "analog hole," many users will not bother? Attention to context
also raises the question whether the initial, simple argument for direct
copying is too narrow. If context shapes creative practice, might direct
copying be an enabler of important uses even when the end product does
not itself require direct copying? If fair use emerges unpredictably from
ordinary use, might the prospects for fair use of works predominantly
disseminated in digital form correlate positively with leakier protection?
The prevailing mode of analysis in fair use cases is so abstract that these
questions and others like them are easily overlooked.
Here again, the entertainment industries have adopted a litigation strategy
intended to prevent courts from considering claims that might enable
litigants to craft a less abstract, more user-centered model of fair use. The
most important prong in this strategy is a hands-off approach to academic
computer scientists, whose work makes transparent the importance of open-
ended tinkering with digital content and digital tools. This approach dates
to 2001, when the Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA")
convinced a court that it need not entertain Princeton computer science
professor Edward Felten's declaratory judgment challenge to the DMCA
because he faced no reasonable risk of suit, even though the initial threat of
suit had come from the RIAA itself.59 The threat was not meritless;
arguably, Felten's research violated the literal text of the statute. To avoid
that result, a court would need to construe the statute to place academic
research papers and any code they might contain outside the scope of the
statute's broad description of covered circumvention technologies. 60 The
RIAA was and remains unwilling to take that risk. Two years later, when
one of Felten's graduate students cracked the just-released MediaMax
digital rights management system for recorded music, the RIAA's initial
posturing rapidly gave way to studied indifference. 61 In lawsuits against
for-profit technology companies, avoiding user-driven claims entirely has
Wojnarowicz v. Am. Family Ass'n, 745 F. Supp. 130, 142-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Time, Inc. v.
Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
59. See Transcript of Motions, Felten v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., No. 01 CV
2669 (D.N.J. Nov. 28, 2001).
60. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (2000).
61. See Fred "Zamboni" Locklear, Press "Shift" to Initiate Lawsuit, Ars Technica, Oct.
9, 2003, http://arstechnica.com/news/posts/1065755223.html; Fred "Zamboni" Locklear,
SunnComm Shifts Stance, Backs Away from Lawsuit, Ars Technica, Oct. 10, 2003,
http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20031010-2961 .html.
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proved more difficult, but the same tactics employed in the ReplayTV
litigation reduce the likelihood that such claims will proceed to judgment. 62
If a court were to consider such a user-driven claim, the prevailing
models of the user do not lend themselves to the development of a more
user-centered, process-based understanding of fair use. Transformative use
is the domain of the romantic user, but scholarly accounts of the romantic
user are more concerned with ends than with means. They portray the
romantic user as a superior being who knows exactly which works he wants
to use and what message he wants to convey. The romantic user therefore
is poorly positioned to explain the processes by which access and use
become transformation. In addition, because scholarly accounts of the
romantic user tend to be insufficiently sensitive to process considerations,
romantically motivated critiques of the DMCA too often regress
automatically to the paradigmatic fair use cases of parody and print-based
criticism. Since neither activity requires direct copying of the targeted
work, this argument is self-defeating.
The economic user's approach to the problem of transformative use is
equally unsatisfying. It is widely acknowledged that some fair uses,
including many transformative uses, create positive externalities from
which society as a whole benefits greatly, and that many such uses would
not be made if the users who make them were required to internalize all of
the costs. This insight justifies having a fair use doctrine, but it does not tell
us how to decide particular cases. Because of this clear mismatch between
individual and social utility, economically inclined judges and scholars
have repeatedly stumbled in their efforts to theorize an economic basis for
identifying those uses that are worth privileging. Closer attention to the
economic user does not help matters. The path from access to manipulation
to transformation depends in part on considerations that the model of the
economic user does not encompass. It is worth noting here that pervasive
distrust of the economic user among fair use advocates also has costs,
because the model of economic user may help to explain aspects of the
transformative use problem that the model of romantic user does not. In
particular, more careful attention to the economic user's internal cost-
benefit calculus might help to support an argument that direct digital
manipulation is a constitutionally significant guarantor of fair use precisely
because it is the most convenient. Ultimately, however, the economic user
is destined to remain an incomplete vehicle for explaining the incidence of
transformative uses.
To a far greater degree than our other two characters, the postmodern
user appreciates both the concept of cultural interoperability and the
62. See, e.g., Macrovision Corp. v. 321 Studios, No. 04 Civ. 00080, 2005 WL 678851, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2005) (granting 32 1's motion to withdraw its answer and be placed in
default on the ground that it "has ceased operations, laid off all of its employees, auctioned
off its few assets, and is subject to both IRS liens and default judgments in other actions");
321 Studios, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 1107 (approving joinder of user's declaratory judgment
claim).
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importance of a process-based understanding of fair use. But the
postmodem user's perspective is not one that appeals to the sensibilities of
judges and policymakers. She rejects the ideal of transformative use, and
the linked notion of authorial creation, precisely on the ground that they
privilege romanticism. That is all very well as a matter of literary theory,
but it does not comport with the persistent and widely held belief that some
uses of copyrighted works are different than others in ways that should
matter both for copyright law and for the future of copyright's progress
project. Once again, then, perversity exacts its price. The postmodem user
cannot command the law's sympathy long enough for her insights to matter.
All of this is to suggest that academic investigations of the fair use
problem should be proceeding by a radically different route. Enormous
effort has been spent, and continues to be spent, in defending the social
importance of transformative uses and fair uses more generally, but that
question is not in serious doubt. Judges who reject fair use arguments do
not do so because they think the fair use doctrine itself should be
eliminated. Even plaintiffs in parody cases do not argue that transformative
uses as a category are unimportant. The contested questions concern how
much use is fair, what sorts of use qualify, and whether fair uses do or do
not require certain background technological conditions. These questions
require context-based determinations that cannot be made without careful
attention to users and the processes by which they participate in their own
culture.
V. USERS AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
The abstract, decontextualized understanding of "use" that predominates
in fair use jurisprudence also shapes copyright's model of the public
domain. As I have argued at length elsewhere, the designation "public
domain" creates a misleading impression of geographic discreteness that
muddies thinking about the practical accessibility of the common elements
in culture. 63 This metaphoric compartmentalization derives much of its
staying power from the fact that the legal construction of the public domain
systematically overlooks the user.
The standard doctrinal account of the public domain holds that it
encompasses works never subject to copyright, works no longer subject to
copyright, and unprotected elements of still-copyrighted works. From this
common descriptive baseline, understandings of the public domain's
purpose diverge radically. One approach, which I have called the "cultural
stewardship" model, sees the public domain as a repository of old and
archetypal content, and understands passage into the public domain as
63. Julie E. Cohen, Copyright, Commodification, and Culture: Locating the Public
Domain, in The Future of the Public Domain (P.B. Hugenholtz & L. Guibault eds.,
forthcoming 2006).
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marking the end of a cultural good's productive life.64 The other, the
"conservancy" model, sees the public domain as encompassing a rich and
varied assortment of intellectual and cultural building blocks, and holds that
resources in the public domain serve as important catalysts for creative
ferment. 65 The choice between these theories has important implications
for the structure of copyright law. That choice is complicated by the
geographic entailments of the public domain metaphor, which leads to a
particular way of thinking about the nature and accessibility of the
resources that are public.
As used in copyright cases, the metaphoric model of the "public domain"
both relies on and encourages a sort of magical thinking in which users play
no part. The space that is the "public domain" has the Heisenbergian
property of being both discretely constituted and instantly accessible to all
users everywhere. Such thinking underlies the copyright doctrines that
define "substantial similarity" broadly and grant equally broad control over
derivative uses, and it enables courts and many commentators to ignore the
practical consequences of these doctrines. If everyone always has access to
the "public domain," then broad exclusive rights for copyright owners
threaten neither access to the common elements of culture nor use of those
elements as the substrate for future creation. A user-centered approach to
these doctrines, in contrast, would understand "publicness" as hinging
importantly on a resource's practical accessibility, and would observe that
copyrighted cultural goods, and especially mass commercial culture,
comprise an increasingly large fraction of the public experience of culture.
These considerations raise important questions about whether the rules
governing both publicness and infringement should be calibrated
differently.
As in the case of fair use, the user's absence from the legal construction
of the public domain also structures the emerging set of rules that governs
the availability of tools for accessing public domain cultural resources. In
the Grokster litigation, both the Ninth Circuit's opinion and Justice
Breyer's concurrence supported their argument for a qualitative
interpretation of the Sony standard with evidence about the use of p2p
networks for distributing public domain files maintained by organizations
64. Id. at 14-17; see, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard Posner, The Economic
Structure of Intellectual Property Law 210-53 (2003); William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 471 (2003).
65. Cohen, supra note 63, at 14-17; see, e.g., Benkler, supra note 5; Yochai Benkler,
Through the Looking Glass: Alice and the Constitutional Foundations of the Public
Domain, Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter/Spring 2003, at 173; James Boyle, The Second
Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, Law & Contemp. Probs.,
Winter/Spring 2003, at 33; David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, Law & Contemp.
Probs., Autumn 1981, at 147; Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 Emory L.J. 965
(1990).
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such as the Prelinger Archive. 66 Both discussions partook heavily of
romance, but their shared protagonist was the romantic public domain, not
the romantic user or any other kind of user.6 7 Users figured in these
discussions only as unremarked and passive vehicles through which public
domain content is transmitted, and the goals of the romantic public domain
thereby advanced. But if that is true, then the logic of the romantic public
domain justifies the results in Napster and Aimster as much as it does the
Ninth Circuit's holding in Grokster. If users are mere passive recipients of
content, it is unclear why preventing unauthorized transmissions should
threaten authorized transmissions, which can be made using many different
technologies. The same logic underlies judicial rejection of claims that the
DMCA's tool bans threaten access to the public domain. As in the case of
fair use, inattention to process leads fairly easily to the conclusion that the
imaginary space that is the "public domain" is not rendered inaccessible
simply because a right holder has used TPMs to restrict access to and use of
specific files.
Our three candidates for the role of user largely contribute to the reigning
confusion about the public domain's location and ontological significance
in the ongoing process of culture formation. Because the romantic user
gives little thought to practical constraints on access to creative resources,
he is generally content to assume, along with courts, that content "in the
public domain" is readily available for reworking. When troubled by the
outcome of a particular infringement dispute or by the implications of
technologically mediated access, his first and often only impulse is to point
to the end product that a different set of rules would allow him to create.
The economic user is differently insensitive to the ways in which
environment and technology structure the creative process. Like the
romantic user, he assumes that creative individuals know in advance what
inputs they will need. Unlike the romantic user, he therefore assumes that
individuals who desire access to technologically protected content can
easily determine whether the benefits of purchasing access outweigh the
costs. The postmodem user's problem, meanwhile, is the same as it was
before: If authorship as such doesn't exist, the postmodern user can neither
envision herself as an author nor explain how the public domain enriches
the creative process in ways relevant to copyright's progress project.
A user-centered approach to the questions surrounding the appropriate
legal characterization of the public domain would have important
implications across a broad range of copyright doctrine. It would affect not
only the way that the public domain is currently constituted, but also the
definition of a copyright owner's rights. By forcing attention to the
experiential determinants of publicness, such an approach also would
66. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1161-62 (9th
Cir. 2004), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005); Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2787, 2789-90 (Breyer,
J., concurring).
67. See Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92
Cal. L. Rev. 1331 (2004).
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encourage closer scrutiny of the technologies that mediate access to the
common elements of culture. To be tenable, however, a user-centered
approach to the public domain requires a more robust theory of the user,
and of the user's role in furthering copyright's progress project.
VI. THE SITUATED USER
Within the past decade, a few scholars have sought to develop a more
precise understanding of the user's role within the copyright system. In
different ways, each of these efforts seeks to remedy some deficiency in
existing models of the user. Together, they supply the foundation for a
fourth character, whom I will call the situated user. The situated user
appropriates cultural goods found within her immediate environment for
four primary purposes: consumption, communication, self-development,
and creative play. The cumulative result of this behavior by situated users,
and of both planned and fortuitous interactions among them, produces what
the copyright system names, and values, as "progress."
First, and importantly, the situated user consumes cultural goods
available to her within her own culture, and those that are accessible to her
from other cultures. What differentiates the situated user from the
economic user is that it is not the fact of consumption that is of primary
importance, but rather the pathways to consumption. Some consumption of
cultural goods results from directed effort by the user, or from advertiser-
supported content directed at the user, but much other consumption does
not follow either of these pathways. Some occurs fortuitously, as a result of
following links created by physical or virtual juxtaposition. Still other
consumption occurs as a result of the user's situatedness within a larger
network of family, friends, colleagues, teachers, students, and
acquaintances, any of whom may share, recommend, or mention any
number of things for any number of reasons. A well-tailored copyright law
cannot focus only on some of these pathways, but must consider them all.
Second, the situated user copies cultural goods for purposes of
communicating with other situated users. In general, copyright law
recognizes only some copying-the transformative kind-as
communicative, and therefore concludes that only the romantic user can
assert a claim to expressive privilege. Two provocative essays by Joseph
Liu and Rebecca Tushnet expose the narrowness of this approach, ably
articulating the expressive values that copying serves wholly separate from
any connection to transformative use. 68 Liu's inquiry is internal to the
68. Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law's Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 397(2003); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech
and How Copying Serves It, 114 Yale L.J. 535 (2004); see also Jack M. Balkin, Digital
Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information
Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (2004) (characterizing freedom of speech as inherently
appropriative); Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to
Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 215 (1996) (arguing that copying
and use of creative works enable processes of social meaning-making).
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copyright system, while Tushnet's focuses on the nexus between copyright
and the First Amendment, yet they offer similar conclusions. Both remind
us that the range of practices subsumed under the label "copying"--
including but not limited to duplication, imitation, performance, and
allusion-are critically important means of expressing one's beliefs, values,
and affiliations.
Third, the situated user appropriates preexisting cultural goods as an
inevitable part of the process of self-development. According to Liu, the
ability to manipulate copies of copyrighted works, and to enjoy repeated
access to such works, furthers intellectual development because it enables
"richer and more complex" interactions with cultural goods.69 In my own
work on the intersection between copyright and privacy, I have linked this
notion of autonomy in intellectual consumption with an interest in
intellectual privacy that has both informational and spatial aspects. 70
Although invocation of self-development once again suggests the romantic
user, within both of these arguments the point is broader than the model of
the romantic user typically allows. Autonomy and privacy in intellectual
consumption further self-development even when they do not lead directly
to the expressive activities with which the romantic user is concerned.
Finally, the situated user engages in creative play, with which "copying"
in all the ways listed above is inextricably linked. Both David Lange and
Eben Moglen have written eloquently about the centrality of play to human
creative activity. 71 Moglen's use of the term homo ludens is, presumably,
an allusion to Huizinga's classic work on the cultural primacy of play.72
Huizinga, however, links play tightly to both contest and mimesis, and
therefore concludes that the performing arts (music, dance, and also poetry)
are much more closely linked to play than are either prose writing or the
visual arts. Moglen and Lange understand play more broadly to include
working and reworking of all sorts. Lange's emphasis on play in
interpretation and reworking evokes to some extent the postmodern user,
but with an important twist: To play is human, and therefore neither
marginality nor powerlessness is required. For Lange, play is a potent
source of cultural power.
69. Liu, supra note 68, at 407; see also Balkin, supra note 68 (discussing the mutually
constitutive relationship between "self' and "culture"); Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital
Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy Ownership, 42 Win. & Mary L. Rev.
1245 (2001) (arguing that autonomy in intellectual consumption is rooted in part in
principles of physical property ownership).
70. Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright
Managment" in Cyberspace, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 981 (1996); Julie E. Cohen, DRM and
Privacy, 18 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 575 (2003).
71. David Lange, At Play in the Fields of the Word: Copyright and the Construction of
Authorship in the Post-Literate Millennium, Law & Contemp. Probs., Spring 1992, at 139;
Lange, supra note 65; David Lange, Reimagining the Public Domain, Law & Contemp.
Probs., Winter/Spring 2003, at 463; Eben Moglen, Anarchism Triumphant: Free Software
and the Death of Copyright, in The Commodification of Information 107 (Niva Elkin-Koren
& Neil Weinstock Netanel eds., 2002).
72. Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture (1950).
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Together, these four activities-consumption, communication, self-
development, and creative play--define the range of human use of cultural
goods. A model of the user predicated on all four practices stands a better
chance of avoiding the artificiality and one-dimensionality that
characterizes the three leading models of the user. Unlike the economic
user, the situated user is more than a narrow, self-interested consumer;
unlike the romantic user, however, she knows when to sit back, have a beer,
and fire up the TiVo. Unlike the postmodern user, the situated user has the
capacity and the will to link her own creative projects aspirationally to
larger dreams of artistic and personal progress.
A focus on the situated user also puts us on the road to overcoming the
second major deficiency in existing theories of the user: the lack of a clear
connection between the behavior of the individual user and copyright's
overarching goal of fostering collective "progress." As a result of excellent
work by a number of scholars, it is increasingly clear that the reigning
modernist formulation of this project is insufficient, and that any serious
formulation must take into account the mutually constitutive relationships
between and among the self, community, and culture. The model of the
situated user satisfies this criterion, since it underscores the reflexivity of
culture. How, though, do the individual (and group) behaviors of
consumption, communication, self-development, and creative play translate
into collective artistic and cultural development?
The key to making this connection lies, I think, in a twofold appreciation
of the process of play. Moglen and Lange speak of play as intentional
activity by individuals. But there is another sense of "play" that is equally
important here, to which the first sense relates. This is the sense described
by Gadamer as the "to-and-fro" within the system of culture.73 Play is the
"flex" in cultural practices of representation; call this the "play of culture,"
as distinct from the "play within culture" engaged in by situated users. As I
have written elsewhere, cultural change moves in a relational network of
actors and artifacts. 74 The "play of culture" describes degrees of freedom
within this network; it is the process by which culture bends and folds
unpredictably, bringing new groups, artifacts, and practices into unexpected
juxtaposition.
This phenomenological description of the play of culture moves us
inexorably back to the situated user, through whose actions the play of
culture is performed. Although the play of culture is not an individual
phenomenon, it is nonetheless partially dependent on the extent of
individual ability to exploit both known resources and instances of
fortuitous access and interconnection. Yet because it is not an individual
phenomenon, the play of culture does not depend only on creative play;
73. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method 102-10 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G.
Marshall trans., 2d rev. ed. 2004).
74. Cohen, supra note 63, at 28-36; see also Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented
Approach to Fair Use, 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1525, 1682-86 (2004) (describing an
"emergentist" approach to creativity that treats culture as a complex system).
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instead, it emerges from the full spectrum of behavior by situated users.
Consumption, communication, self-development, and creative play merge
and blur into one another, and the play of culture is the result. This has, it
seems to me, enormous importance for the way copyright's project is
understood. Scholars and judges confidently speak of inducing creativity
and discouraging slavish imitation, as if the two could be neatly separated.
But if these practices are understood not only as related but as together
comprising the very stuff of "progress," it becomes harder to envision the
former without the latter.
Operationally, then-and here is the nub of the problem for copyright-
both the play of culture and play within culture require doctrinal
accommodation. The situated user flourishes, and copyright's progress
project also flourishes, to the extent that law and practice enable a flexible
combination of targeted access, fortuitous exposure, autonomous
consumption, and open-ended play. The situated user requires a degree of
autonomy to seek out new cultural experiences and to manipulate the
cultural objects she encounters, but benefits also from a degree of
unpredictability in context-driven access to cultural objects. A well-
designed copyright system should facilitate all parts of this process, and that
is no easy task.
VII. A NOT-SO-MODEST PROPOSAL
If I am right about the relevance of the situated user for copyright law
and policy, then the questions that copyright scholars and lawmakers need
to consider are far-reaching. As I have tried to show, the user's absence
from copyright doctrine is a self-perpetuating phenomenon. Systemic
failure to consider the user both legitimates judicially driven elision and
encourages right holders and technology developers to ignore the user as a
matter of practice. In many of the cases discussed in Parts II-V, one could
reasonably conclude that the courts were bound by the language or by
precedent to do exactly as they did, but that does not make the resulting
rules defensible. To the extent that the copyright system relies on the
situated user to advance its goals, copyright law should acknowledge and
comprehensively adjust for the situated user's importance.
What sort of accommodation does the situated user require? A system of
copyright, like any other system of law, must begin with generally
applicable rules. I do not intend to suggest, and do not believe, that each
user's needs should be evaluated on a case-specific basis. Nor am I
suggesting simply that copyright law should recognize conduct falling
within certain social patterns of information use as fair use.75 Although I
think that copyright law should accord established social patterns of
information use much greater respect than it now does, I do not think that a
legal regime concerned with fostering intellectual and creative progress
75. See Madison, supra note 74.
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should reserve its solicitude only for established patterns. I have argued
that copyright law should direct its attention instead to a much more general
pattern embodied in the dialectic between the two senses of "play."
What I want to suggest, then, is at once more conservative and more
radical than either of the above alternatives: Copyright should recognize
the situated, context-dependent character of both consumption and
creativity, and the complex interrelationships between creative play, the
play of culture, and progress, and should adjust its baseline rules-not
simply its exceptions-accordingly. Scholars and policy makers should ask
how much latitude the situated user needs to perform her functions most
effectively, and how the entitlement structure of copyright law might
change to accommodate that need. In particular, they should be prepared to
ask whether the situated user is well served by the current copyright system
of broad rights and narrow, limited exemptions, or whether she would be
better served by a system that limits the rights of copyright owners more
narrowly in the first instance. 76 This is not, to use Michael Madison's
terminology, a choice to emphasize the "primacy of the actor" over the
"primacy of the pattern. '77 The choice is not either/or, but both/and; it is
actors within contexts who produce "progress."
Striking the right balance between owners and users-between the
convenience of clear, broad entitlements and the importance of play in both
senses described above-is likely to require some difficult tradeoffs. The
matter is further complicated by the fact that the category of "users" is
highly heterogeneous, 78 and by the fact that individual users themselves
will often have conflicting interests. All of these questions remain to be
addressed, and will require sustained, collaborative attention. But the
tradeoffs are no more difficult than those that the current system of
copyright imposes, unacknowledged, on users and on creative practice more
generally. In undertaking this process, it will perhaps be helpful to
remember that copyright is a system of legal regulation overlaid on
processes of human learning and creativity that have existed for millennia.
Those processes are still quite poorly understood, and much work remains
to be done in understanding the pathways by which exposure, consumption
and copying lead into creative play, and by which private creative play
becomes more public contribution to the creative fabric of a common
culture. Under the circumstances, our guiding principle should be the one
often attributed to Hippocrates: First, do no harm.
76. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Cohen, supra note 63, at 42-47.
77. Madison, supra note 74, at 1639-40.
78. In addition, as Rebecca Tushnet reminds us, many users of copyrighted works are
not individuals. Rebecca Tushnet, My Library: Copyright and the Role of Institutions in a
Peer-to-Peer World (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). A fuller model of
the situated user must say something about these other users as well.
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